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UP THE CREEK WITH A PADDLE: WATER DOCTRINE
AS A BASIS FOR SMALL WIND ENERGY
RESOURCE RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION

Responding to contemporary increases in conventional energy resource costs, state and federal governments have renewed their promotion of the development and use of renewable energy sources with
an effort not seen since the energy crisis of the late 1970s. 1 Recent
increases in energy costs and a focus on pollution reduction have
spurred the development and marketing of renewable energy technologies.2 These developments have increased the feasibility and affordability for homeowners who wish to install wind turbines for
personal energy needs. 3 These personal wind turbines are generally
referred to as small wind systems. 4 However, despite increased conventional energy costs and improvements in renewable energy technologies, the realization of renewable energy production goals
energy proremains hampered by long-recognized barriers to wind
5
duction, such as land use laws and nuisance concerns.
Notwithstanding wind energy's increasing importance and development, a legal framework that defines the rights to wind as an energy
resource does not exist. This legal framework is needed in order to
encourage and protect the environment, property rights, and wind en1. See Clifford Krauss, Study Suggests That, Unlike in the '70s, Energy Lessons Will Last, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2008, at C4; cf. Tara Siegel Bernard & Kate Galbraith, Bailout Brings with It

Diverse Perks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at C6 (reporting that the economic bailout package will
offer thirty percent tax credits for small wind turbine installations). Small wind energy systems
put in operation in either 2009 or 2010 qualify for a grant in lieu of the tax credit for thirty
percent of the value of the system. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
2. AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, SMALL WIND TURBINE GLOBAL MARKET STUDY 8 (2008),
available at http://www.awea.org/smallwind/pdf/2008-AWEASmallWindTurbineGlobal_
MarketStudy.pdf.
3. See John Casey, Technology Smooths the Way for Home Wind-Power Turbines, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 2008, at F3.
4. Small wind turbines are clean, wind-powered electric generators that produce energy at a
rate of 100 kilowatts (kW) or less to power homes, farms, and small businesses. American Wind
Energy Association, Small Wind, http://www.awea.org/smallwind/ (last visited Jul. 11, 2009). The
terms "windmill,". "wind system," and "turbine" appear throughout this Comment and are used
interchangeably.
5. See Michael L. Pisauro Jr., Renewables and Land Use Law, 23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T
39, 40 (2008).

142

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:141

ergy development at the individual and public utility-scaled levels. 6
However, the use of patently novel concepts in the development of a
wind rights framework would inevitably lead to conflicts with existing
law; therefore, any approach to devise such a framework should be
7
cabined within existing legal concepts.
Investment in small wind energy systems is accelerating;8 9,092
small wind units were sold in the United States in 2007. 9 In October
2008, the average cost of electricity in the U.S. residential sector was
11.91 ¢ per kilowatt-hour (kWh), 10 and in 2007, the average American
home consumed 936 kWh of electricity per month. 1 Taken together,
the average American home spends over $1,300 per year on electricity. Small wind energy systems are a viable means to offset or eliminate the significant costs of home electricity. The installation costs of
a small wind turbine can be recouped in less than ten years, depending
upon the size, cost, and efficiency of the turbine installed, as well as
the available wind, local cost of traditional electricity, and available
incentives.1 2 Although the technology is increasingly affordable, the
investment can be significant for the homeowner. 13
Naturally, the substantial cost to install a wind energy system necessitates protection of the investment and protection of the value of the
energy it is expected to generate.1 4 Corporate wind farms have a
number of means at their disposal to protect such investments from
6. See generally Ernest Smith, Wind Energy: Siting Controversiesand Rights in Wind, 1 ENVTL.
& ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 281, 283 (2007) (discussing the status and contemplating the future of
"the emerging body of wind law").
7. See Troy Rule, A Downwind View of the Cathedral: Using Rule Four to Allocate Wind

Rights, 46 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 207, 213-15 (2009).
8. Susan Morse. Wind Turbines Go Residential, SEACOASTONLINE, Feb. 22, 2009, http://www.
seacoastonline.com/articles/200902222-NEWS-902220339 (last visited Jul. 11, 2009).
9. AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, supra note 2, at 3.
10. OFFICE OF COAL, NUCLEAR, ELECTRIC, & ALTERNATIVE FUELS, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,

ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY 110 tbl. 5.3 (July 2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneafl
electricity/epm/epm.pdf.
11. OFFICE OF COAL, NUCLEAR, ELECTRIC, & ALTERNATIVE FUELS, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
U.S. AVERAGE MONTHLY BILL BY SECTOR, CENSUS DIVISION, AND STATE (2009), http://

www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/esr/table5.html (collecting data for the year 2007).
12. AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, THE ECONOMICS OF SMALL WIND (2009), http://www.awea.
org/smallwind/toolbox2lTOOLS/factsheet economics.pdf.
13. Purchase and installation costs of small wind energy systems range from $3,000 to $5,000
per kilowatt of capacity. See id.
14. Installation costs vary with the size and type of the small wind energy system. Rooftop
models may cost as little as $5,000, but other residential systems with towers ranging in height
from thirty-three to one hundred feet may cost from $12,000 to $55,000. See Kate Galbraith,
Personal-Size Wind Power, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2008, at Cl; Kristina Shevory, Homespun Electricity, Generated from the Wind, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, at Fl. However, some small wind
system owners may not "care about how much it costs," even while knowing that energy cost
savings will not be realized soon after installation. Galbraith, supra. These owners may be moti-
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obstruction or activities on adjoining lands that may impair their ability to harvest wind for energy production and sale. 15 For example,
large-scale wind farms can secure access to wind through the purchase
of adjoining property, the acquisition of negative easements over
16
neighboring property, and the use of non-interference contracts.
However, the typical private homeowner does not have the same
means at his disposal because corporate methods of securing access
are often costly. 17 Thus, operators of small wind energy systems must
pursue other means of securing access to wind.
It is a well-established principle that the definitive rights to a natural resource control that resource's allocation: 18 they govern the claim,
the use, and the transfer of the resource. 19 Viewing wind as an energy
resource is the starting point for establishing a legal framework to resolve disputes that arise from wind access and land use conflicts. Currently, there is no widely held doctrine that defines a landowner's
right to capture wind to generate energy. 20 Legal doctrines that de21
fine rights and govern allocation of other resources can fill that void.
Principles imported from other natural resource allocation doctrines
should address the following: the property rights of the windmill
owner and those of neighboring properties; the uniqueness of the
wind at a particular location, including the suitability of the location
for wind capture; the equities of the parties involved; the statutory and
relevant common laws; and the public policy endorsed by federal and
vated by energy independence, environmental concerns, and developing renewable energy technologies. Id.
15. Howard E. Susman & Kathleen J. Doll, Wind Advisory, 30 L.A. LAW. 35, 36 (2008) (advocating the use of subordination, nondisturbance, and attornment agreements (SNDAs) with third
parties to guard against interference on land leased for wind farm operations).
16. Id.; see also Mustafa P. Ostrander, Wind Power: A Lawyer's Guide to Representing Landowners, 16 Bus. L. TODAY 24, 26-28 (2007) (describing the interests that developers seek to
protect with easements and wind lease agreements); Susan Perera, Note, Following Minnesota's
Renewable Energy Example: Will FederalLegislation Fly High or Flap in the Wind?, 9 MINN. J. L.
Sci. & TECH. 949, 958 (2008) (discussing developer use of easements and covenants).
17. See generally Pisauro, supra note 5 (discussing how contemporary land use law and renewable energy legislation is not protective and does not offer enough incentives for small wind
energy generators).
18. See Micha Gisser & Ronald N. Johnson, InstitutionalRestrictions on the Transfer of Water
Rights and the Survival of an Agency, in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION,
BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 137, 139 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1983).
19. See id.
20. See Smith, supra note 6, at 299-302 (discussing unresolved issues with respect to wind
appropriation as a property right).
21. See id. at 300-01 (considering oil, gas and mineral, percolating water, and wild animal
doctrines as potentially helpful in describing rights to wind). But see Lisa Chavarria, Wind
Power, 68 TEX. B.J. 832, 835 (2005) (explaining the difficulty in finding an analogous doctrine to
describe wind rights and the limited ability of oil and gas, wild animals, and percolating waters
laws to describe those rights).
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state governments. 22 Some have proposed a wind rights doctrine
drawn from the laws of wild animals, percolating water, or oil and gas
rights. 23 However, due to wind's renewability, others have suggested
that such analogies are inappropriate. 24 Any theory set forth to concretize the concept of a right to appropriate wind should take into
account wind's fugitive nature, as well as its inexhaustible characteristic. 25 For this reason, solar rights and water rights may prove to be
valuable analogous doctrines. 26 However, solar rights theory remains

largely undeveloped and perhaps unreliable, despite some favorable
27
case law and protective statutes.
This Comment argues that water use doctrines provide the most
useful analogies for the development of a theory that defines the small
wind energy operator's rights to wind. 28 Water, like wind, is relatively non-depletable-a trait wind does not share with oil and gas. 2 9
Water rights also have a well-developed legal history. 30
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of contemporary energy use and wind energy production, and it distinguishes the needs of
the small wind energy operator from those of wind farm operators. 3 1
Additionally, Part II describes legislative protection of wind rights, efforts to promote wind energy development and use, 32 and relevant
case law that illustrates the distinction between traditional property
ownership and ownership of wind rights.3 3 Finally, Part II provides an
22. See Smith, supra note 6, at 282-83.
23. Id. at 300-01.
24. LYNDE COIT, MIDWEST RESEARCH INST., WIND ENERGY: LEGAL ISSUES AND INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS 11 (1979).
25. Smith, supra note 6, at 301. Smith concludes that using a property-based theory to define
the "wind estate" is necessary so that "companies and individuals ... feel sufficiently secure in
and certain of their rights that they are willing to make the investments necessary to gain the
benefits of wind energy." Id. at 317. Smith analogizes the current legal status of wind energy to
that of gas and oil in the early twentieth century, noting that one of the challenges to indoctrinating oil and gas appropriation rights was its fugitive nature. Id. at 282.
26. Corr, supra note 24, at 11; see also Perera, supra note 16, at 956-57 (suggesting the use of
common law solar rights as a model for wind rights).
27. See Tawny L. Alvarez, Comment, Don't Take My Sunshine Away: Right-to-Light and Solar
Energy in the Twenty-First Century, 28 PACE L. REV. 535, 539-48 (2008) (briefly illustrating the
shortcomings of using prescriptive and common law easement methods to resolve sunlight access
problems while state statutes protect sunlight access by validating private easement agreements).
28. See discussion infra notes 116-269 and accompanying text.
29. Smith, supra note 6, at 301. However, Smith summarily rejects water as a physically similar "substance" without explanation. Id.; cf. CoLT, supra note 24, at 11 (wary of a water analogy
due to the complexity of the doctrine).
30. Water rights historically concerned navigation and fishing and date back to the first century. See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 14-21 (2d ed. 1990).

31. See infra notes 38-59 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 60-97 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
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overview of the two doctrines upon which modern water regulations
are founded: the riparian doctrine and the prior appropriation doctrine. 34 Part III constructs a wind rights doctrine by drawing from the
well of water rights. 35 Part IV analyzes the impact that the proposed
wind rights doctrine will have on the implementation of small wind
energy systems, and it suggests legislative vehicles that might work in
conjunction with such a theory. 36 Part V concludes that a wind rights
theory based on water rights will prove to be a useful tool in the promotion and protection of wind energy generation, and it suggests that
a wind rights theory based on water rights will provide a predictable
37
means of resolving wind access issues for small system owners.
II.

BACKGROUND

Over time, the allocation of a particular resource becomes governed
by a legal doctrine suited to that resource, 38 yet the allocation of wind
lacks its own theory of governance. Many states have passed legislation that promotes the development and use of wind energy on a personal level, but this legislation generally offers only non-guaranteed
tax incentives. 39 One jurisdiction has recognized wind rights as a severable interest in real property, 40 but as argued in this Comment,
traditional property theory is inadequate to encompass the needs of
small wind energy operators. Only Wisconsin has passed legislation
that bars the obstruction of personal wind turbines, 41 but other states
have similar statutes that prohibit the obstruction of sunlight from a
landowner's solar panels-a potential source of law for a wind rights
theory. 42 Although small wind energy rights are largely unprotected,
34. See infra notes 116-176 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 177-257 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 258-269 and accompanying text.
37. See infra note 270 and accompanying text.
38. See Gisser & Johnson, supra note 18, at 139.
39. See GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-29.13 (2005 & Supp. 2008); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/10-600
(2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-201 (Supp. 2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 307.175 (2008).
40. See Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272, 277 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997) (recognizing that despite their novelty, wind rights are a substantial property interest). The California Court of Appeals has held that a wind estate is severable from the surface
estate in an eminent domain action. Id. The court reasoned that "windpower rights are 'substantial rights' capable of being bought and sold in the marketplace .... [Olne may have a right
to use windpower rights without owning any interest in the land." Id. at 277.
41. Wisconsin considers construction or vegetative growth an actionable nuisance if it follows
the installation of a wind energy system on adjoining property. WIs. STAT. § 844.22 (2008).
42. The "prohibition" generally takes the form of official recognition of a landowner's right to
create skyspace easements for the purposes of solar and wind energy generation. See, e.g., Solar
Shade Control Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25980 (West 2007) (recognizing that a balance is
needed between state interests of vegetation and renewable energy); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-
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scholars have suggested that legislators should define rights in wind by
analogizing to the laws that govern oil and gas, minerals, solar energy,
and property. 43 The increasing need to define wind rights thus requires an analysis of analogous energy resource doctrines, around
which access rights for small wind energy operators may be
44
structured.
A.

Current Wind Energy Use and Consumption

Wind and renewable energy consumption and production is expanding: in 2007, seven percent of all energy consumed in the United
States was produced by renewable resources,45 and of that, fifty-one
percent was used to generate electricity. 46 Additionally, wind energy
47
constituted five percent of all renewable energy generated in 2007,
the vast majority of which was electricity generated on commercial
farms. 48 In fact, in 2007 alone, the amount of electricity generated by
wind energy increased forty-five percent, 49 an increase that could
power an additional 1.5 million American homes. 50 Almost all of this
electricity was generated by commercial wind farms, which are gener32.5-102 (2008) (recognizing a prohibition if an express solar easement is violated by restrictions
defined in the instrument); MINN. STAT. § 500.30 (2008) (allowing the creation of and defining
the minimal provisions of solar and wind easement agreements); NEB. REV. STAT. § 66-911
(2008) (describing the minimum contents of solar and wind energy easements); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 477:50 (1992) (describing the minimum content of solar easements and imposing a tenyear default termination rule unless parties expressly agree otherwise); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-40-2
(1995) (recognizing skyspace easements and limiting the obstruction of a solar energy system to
ten percent within the easement); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-13-2 (2000) (requiring a written instrument for solar easement creation, at a minimum describing prohibited obstructions). But see
N.M. STAT. § 47-3-11 (2003) (describing all solar rights for energy use, rather than merely an
allowance for the creation of solar easements).
43. See Smith, supra note 6, at 300-02 (discussing oil and gas and water doctrines as possible
analogous doctrines); see also Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d
272 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (analogizing wind appropriation rights to oil and gas); cf COlT, supra
note 24, at 11 (supporting an analogy to solar rights when crafting wind rights doctrine but
rejecting an analogy to nonrenewable energy resources).
44. See ColT, supra note 24, at 11.
45. Energy Info. Admin., Dep't of Energy, Renewable Energy Consumption and Electricity
Preliminary 2007 Statistics (2008), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/alternate/page/renew-energyconsump/rea-prereport.html (last visited Jul. 11, 2009). Comparatively, eighty-five percent of all
energy consumed in the United States was generated by petroleum, natural gas, and coal. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. In 2008, a rapid expansion increased "wind energy generating capacity in the U.S. [to] ...
25,170 MW . . . enough electricity to power the equivalent of close to 7 million households."
Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass'n, Wind Energy Grows by Record 8,300 MW in 2008 (Jan.
26, 2008), available at http://www.awea.org/newsroom/releases/wind-energy-growth2008_27Jan
09.html (last visited Jul. 11, 2009).
49. Krauss, supra note 1, at C4.
50. Id.
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ally comprised of turbines that stand 200 or more feet tall.5 1 Wind
farms are expected to produce enough electricity to power 4.5 million
American homes in 2008, equivalent to over one percent of the total
amount of electricity produced annually in the United States. 52 The
cost of developing a wind farm may approach $1 billion, which includes property acquisition by fee or lease, easement procurement,
and other costs. 53 The significant investment in wind projects enhances the need to guard against wind obstruction by adjoining landowners. 54 To protect against obstructions, corporate wind developers
resort to various remedies and mechanisms that generally take the
form of subordination, non-disturbance, and attornment agreements
55
(SNDAs), as well as contracts, easements, and property purchases.
However, these measures require capital that a small wind operator is
not likely to possess.
Technological improvements have reduced the size of wind turbines, increased efficiency, and lowered the costs of small wind energy
systems, thereby increasing the practicality of home installation.5 6 A
single small wind turbine may be capable of generating from 100 kW
to 34,000 kW of electricity per year.5 7 The cost to acquire and install a
wind turbine is the cost of the "turbine, the tower, wiring, and installation, less any state or federal tax credits. ' '58 Although installation
costs may be manageable, the costs associated with securing wind access for small wind energy operators may not. This could potentially
51. Ronald H. Rosenberg, Making Renewable Energy a Reality-Finding Ways to Site Wind
Power Facilities, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & PoL'v REV. 635, 641 & n.28 (2008).
52. U.S. Wind Power Generation Grows by 45 Percent in 2007, ENV'T NEWS SERV., Jan. 31,
2008, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/an2008/2008-01-31-091.asp.
53. For example, the 130-turbine Cape Wind project slated for installation off of Cape Cod is
expected to cost over $1 billion. See Abby Goodnough, Wind Farm Clears BureaucraticHurdle,
but Critics Vow a Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, at All. The current investment stands at $40
million without construction having begun. Id. The much publicized dispute over the siting of
the wind farm is now in its eighth year. Id. Proponents of the farm state that it will provide
seventy-five percent of Cape Cod's power needs and negligibly impact local scenery, but opponents claim the project will hinder navigation, the local economy, and the environment. Id.
Several steps in the permit process must be completed before construction can begin. Id.
54. See Susman & Doll, supra note 15, at 35, 36.
55. Id. at 38.
56. See Casey, supra note 3, at F3. But see Galbraith, supra note 14, at C9 (reporting that the
motivating factor in installing such a system is born of environmental concerns and that the value
of the electricity generated by such small systems may never approach installation costs).
57. The output determination is based on average wind speed and rotor diameter. See PAUL
GIPE,WIND ENERGY COMES OF AGE 494 (1995) [hereinafter COMES OF AGE]. The power generated by a windmill is also a function of air density. See PAUL GIVE, WIND POWER 30 (2004)
[hereinafter WIND POWER]. Small wind turbines might generate 100 kWh to 1,000 kWh per
year, depending upon average annual wind speed and the efficiency of the turbine. Id. at 59
fig.4-2.
58. GIVE, WIND POWER, supra note 57, at 73.
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stifle clean energy development and undermine federal and state
59
goals.
B.

Relevant History of Rights in Wind and Renewable
Energy Promotion

Although the federal government has passed legislation declaring
the importance of developing wind energy systems, the states have
generally taken the lead in regulating wind energy and creating incentives for its use and development. 60 However, while most states recognize the creation of wind and solar easements, 61 only one state has
implemented statutory protection of wind access that is specifically
62
designed to protect wind-generated electricity.
1.

Federal Statutory Provisions That Are Relevant to Residential
Wind Energy Systems

Federal recognition that small wind energy systems are a viable
means of energy production is not novel. Indeed, the Wind Energy
Systems Act of 1980 provides that "the use of small wind energy systems for certain applications is already economically feasible, and
therefore, the Federal Government should not undertake any financial incentive or financial initiative [that] may detrimentally affect
commercial markets for small wind energy systems. ' '63
The U.S. government recently renewed and expanded tax incentives
for small wind systems with the passage of the Energy Improvement
and Extension Act of 2008.64 The Act extends tax incentives for small
wind systems through December 31, 201665 by offering a renewable
59. See generally Pisauro, supra note 5, at 51.
60. See Perera, supra note 16, at 966-74.
61. For a survey of state statutes giving validity to the creation of wind easements, see supra
note 42.
62. See Wis. STAT. § 844.22 (2008).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 9201(a)(6) (2006). The government's focus on "commercial markets" seeks to
protect manufacturers and retailers of small wind systems, yet it leaves homeowners who would
install such systems unprotected against legislation that may stifle the actual use of such systems.
Id.
64. 26 U.S.C.A. § 48 (2009). Interestingly, the legislation was part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization package enacted by Congress to "provid[e] stability to and prevent[ ] disruption [of] the economy and financial system," which may suggest that Congress views renewable
energy use not only as sound environmental policy, but also as a tool to achieve long-term economic health. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5201 (2009)). The parts of the bill affecting renewable energy incentives serve as an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 in order to
provide additional tax incentives and extend expiring provisions. 26 U.S.C.A. § 48.
65. 26 U.S.C.A. § 48 (c)(4)(C) (2009). The credit was formerly available for systems installed
before January 1, 2009. See 26 U.S.C. § 45(d)(1) (2006).
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66
energy credit of thirty percent for residential wind properties.
Under the Act, any expenditure on property that uses a small wind
67
turbine to generate electricity qualifies for the incentive.

2.

State Legislative Protection and Promotion of Small Wind
Energy Systems

States have undertaken the most meaningful efforts to promote
small wind energy. 68 States generally codify their intent to promote
renewable energy development, 69 and some states have specifically
addressed the use of small wind systems by single homeowners.7 0 For
example, Georgia currently provides a tax credit of up to $10,500 for
single family residences that purchase and construct wind energy systems. 7 1 Likewise, Louisiana offers a tax credit to individual home72
owners for the purchase and installation of wind energy systems.
Starting in 2008, Louisiana began issuing a credit equal to fifty percent
of the first $25,000 spent on the installation of such a system; however,
the credit precludes the homeowner from taking any other state property tax credit. 73 Other states exempt property from taxation if it is
used exclusively for wind-generated electricity. 74 Unfortunately, these
exemptions are of no help to the individual homeowner with a small
wind system because property tax incentives are generally available
75
only for large commercial wind farms.
66. 26 U.S.C.A. § 48(a) (2009).
67. 26 U.S.C.A. § 48(c)(4) (2009).
68. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, Diversifying America's Energy Future: The Future of Renewable Wind Power, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 505, 532 (2008) (remarking that the federal government
largely encourages investment rather than making policy that truly advances the use of wind as
an energy resource).
69. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 687/6-3 (2008) (outlining administrative duties to "foster
investment in and the development ...

of renewable energy resources"); MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 70-17-303 (2007) (stating the requirements for wind energy easements); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 674:17 (2008) (structuring zoning ordinances so that they encourage the installation and use of
renewable energy systems); VA. CODE ANN. § 67-201 (2007) (requiring that the Virginia Energy
Plan incorporate provisions for siting wind energy systems).
70. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6030 (2009) (granting a tax credit); ME. REV. STAT.

ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3211-C (2008) (creating a rebate program); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 6(d)
(2008) (granting a tax credit).
71. GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-29.13 (2005 & Supp. 2008).
72. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6030 (2009).
73. § 47:6030(B)(1).
74. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN4. § 79-201 (1997) (exempting only property predominately used
for wind-generated electricity); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:6030(B)(1). But see MiNN. STAT.
§ 272.029 (2008) (tax incentives for large-scale wind farms are one hundred times greater than
incentives for small wind systems).
75. Id.
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Aside from tax incentives, states may also provide grants for wind
energy projects or require that conventional electricity providers offer
net metering. 76 Net metering has effectively encouraged homeowners
to install small wind energy systems. 77 Net-metering programs vary by
state but require that wind energy systems be connected to the existing utility grid to participate. 78 In jurisdictions where net metering
programs are available, an owner of a wind energy system that produces more electricity than the owner consumes-which results in a
"supply" to the grid-is eligible for an energy credit, or at the very
least, the owner may realize a reduction in electricity costs. 79 States
that are fearful of a backlash from utility companies that may be
tempted to unfairly treat net-metering participants can enact anti-discrimination statutes to protect personal wind-energy owners from re80
taliatory utility rates, fees, or withholding of services.
Resistance by neighbors to the erection of windmills on private residential property is typically rooted in concerns about noise and aes81
thetics, and these concerns often give rise to nuisance claims.
Overcoming these claims presents a problem for the private turbine
owner, 82 who is also likely to face zoning ordinance challenges to a
wind energy system.8 3 Rose v. Chaikin illustrates the use of judicial
76. For example, Illinois makes grants available for public schools to install renewable systems, including wind energy systems. The grants cover fifty percent of the total cost to install
such a system, up to $1 million. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 687/6-5.5 (2009).
77. Casey, supra note 3, at F3 (net metering changes the economics of residential wind generating for the better).
78. NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SMALL WIND ELECTRIC SYSTEMS: A U.S. CONSUMER'S GUIDE 15-16 (2007).

79. See, e.g., 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-107.5(b)(iv) (2008).
80. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-83-104 (2005).

81. See, e.g., Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A,2d 1378 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982) (recognizing the
social utility of windmills, but holding that its utility did not outweigh the health and nuisance
concerns of neighbors who sought an injunction against the operation of a privately owned windmill); see also Dadonna v. Town of Watertown, No. CV074013655S, 2008 WL 4983772, at *1
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 2008) (plaintiffs objected to the grant of a variance that would allow
installation of a private windmill); Bomba v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, No. 293552, 2005 WL
2106162, at *1, *8 (Mass. Land Ct. Sept. 1, 2005) (summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs who
objected to a variance granted to install two additional wind energy test towers on an existing
wind farm); In re Halnon, 811 A.2d 161, 166 (Vt. 2002) (holding that the denial of plaintiff's
application for a personal wind turbine was proper because an average person may have found
the proposal "offensive or shocking").
82. See Peter Applebome, On an Upstate Wind Turbine Project, Opinions As Varied As the
Weather, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2007, at 27; Shevory, supra note 14, at F4 (highlighting opponents'
concerns with noise, aesthetics, and shadows); see also Casey, supra note 3, at F3 (warning that
"in urban and suburban areas, neighbors are never happy to see a 60- to 120-foot tower going up

across the street").
83. See Pisauro, supra note 5, at 40 (arguing that "[s]tumbling blocks to ... energy independence and ...

laws").

reduction in the use of fossil fuels" are generally the "result of various land use
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discretion when upset neighbors attempt to enjoin the operation of
private windmills. 84 In Rose, the court held that the plaintiff had an
actionable common law nuisance claim against the operation of the
windmill even though local zoning laws allowed the operation of private windmills. 85 The defendant's windmill consistently exceeded a
noise emission limit of fifty decibels, and it disturbed neighboring
landowners who owned property that was located ten feet from the
windmill.8 6 Under the common law, the court reasoned that the social
utility of a windmill-specifically, furthering the national need to conserve energy by the use of an alternate renewable source of powerwas outweighed by the amount of harm it created.8 7 This illustrates
the potential for undesirable outcomes for small wind operators when
traditional nuisance factors are weighed against local ordinances that
allow for wind energy systems. Also problematic for small wind systems are zoning ordinances that specifically allow for wind energy
production, yet typically contemplate only wind farms. 88
Although states may intend to foster renewable energy development through net metering regulations, tax incentives, and other
mechanisms, zoning ordinances may hinder the installation of small
renewable energy systems. 89 To combat this effect, states have enacted statutes that prohibit the adoption of ordinances and regulations
that unreasonably restrict an owner's use of a wind energy system on
his own property. 90 States may also take a promotional approach in
lieu of a purely restrictive approach to municipal zoning and land use
ordinances by encouraging local municipalities to adopt measures that
promote renewable energy development. 91
84. 453 A.2d 1378 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982). In holding that a neighbor's windmill was
an actionable nuisance under the common law, the court declared that the social utility of a
windmill in furthering the national need to conserve energy by the use of an alternate renewable
source of power was outweighed by the amount of harm it created. Id. at 1382.
85. Id. at 1383.
86. Id. at 1381. However, the court suggested that intermittent violations of local noise ordinances may not rise to the level of nuisance. Id.
87. Id. at 1382. But see Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635, 638-39 (N.D. 1992) (affirming the
trial court's dismissal of a nuisance claim seeking to enjoin continued use of a neighbor's windmill that operated at fifty to sixty-nine decibels and may have thrown ice into neighboring property because it did not unreasonably interfere with plaintiffs' enjoyment and use of property).
88. See Kenneth H. Young, Wind Power, in 2 ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAw OF ZONING
§ 9:48A (4th ed. 2008).
89. Pisauro, supra note 5, at 40.
90. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 278.0208 (2008) ("A governing body shall not adopt an ordinance, regulation or plan or take any other action that prohibits or unreasonably restricts the
owner of real property from using a system for obtaining solar or wind energy on his property.").
91. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 66-913 (2007) (codifying the protection and development of
wind energy access in order to promote energy conservation).
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But not all states welcome wind energy systems, and they therefore
regulate with caution in order to avoid inadvertently opening their
doors to the installation of wind energy systems. For example, although Ohio and Iowa do not expressly bar the installation of windmill systems, they limit nonagricultural use of land in order to
preserve food production capabilities. 92 Thus, conflicts between government-backed incentives to foster wind energy development and
land regulations that inadvertently or pretextually hinder wind system
installations must be resolved.
While statutory efforts to promote the installation of commercialscale wind energy systems are in vogue, states have not shown the
same enthusiasm for protecting the rights of small wind energy system
owners.93 Only Wisconsin has codified the right to a remedy against
adjoining landowners who obstruct wind and hamper wind energy systems. 9 4 Specifically, in Wisconsin, a wind energy system owner may
receive damages for the obstruction of wind created by the actions of
an adjoining land owner who exceeds the bounds of the zoning laws
that govern the adjoining landowner's property. 95 Moreover, Wisconsin statutorily classifies construction or vegetation on adjoining or
nearby property as a private nuisance if the installation of the solar or
wind energy system on the subject property preceded these obstructions. 96 This provision grants system owners a remedy, notwithstanding the adjoining landowners' compliance with local zoning and land
use regulations. 97
C.

Wind Rights and Relevant Case Law

In the seminal wind rights case of Contra Costa Water District v.
Vaquero Farms, Inc., the California Court of Appeals recognized a
right to the wind that traverses one's property. 98 In that case, the
plaintiff took possession of the defendant's ranch through eminent domain. 99 The defendant attempted to maximize its just compensation
92. See, e.g., IowA CODE § 352.1 (2008); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 931.02 (Supp. 2009).
93. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:63 (2008) (prohibiting local land use regulations
from unreasonably hindering the performance of small wind energy systems).
94. WIs. STAT. § 700.41(3) (2008).
95. § 700.41(1), (4) (requiring that the installation of the small wind energy system precede
the obstruction, so long as the system was not installed prior to 1994).
96. Id. The statute provides that "[any structure that is constructed or vegetative growth that
occurs on adjoining or nearby property after a . . . wind energy system ...

is installed on any

property, that interferes with the functioning of the.., wind energy system, is considered to be a
private nuisance." WiS. STAT. § 844.22 (2008).
97. WIs. STAT. § 700.41(3) (2008).
98. 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
99. Id. at 274.
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award by seeking a declaration that its wind power rights were not
severable from a fee simple interest in land that is subject to eminent
domain proceedings.1 0 0 In holding that the plaintiff could sever and
reserve the wind power rights in the property to the defendant, the
court reasoned that "wind power rights are 'substantial rights' capable
of being bought and sold in the marketplace."' 10 1 The court took notice of the fact that the defendant had "derived [an] economic benefit
from the dissection of its property rights by separately leasing wind
power rights to a third party.' 0 2 Therefore, the court expressly recognized a right to the wind that traverses one's property.
03
Likewise, in Choctaw, Oklahoma & Texas Railroad Co. v. True,
the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas recognized a specific right to wind
access. 10 4 In this case, the plaintiffs sought damages resulting from
105
construction of an embankment that was adjacent to their property.
When considering the admissibility of evidence that would support the
plaintiffs' claim for damages, the court ruled that it was proper to allow evidence that the embankment, which was part of the new railway, impaired the use of the plaintiff's windmill and thus contributed
to the damages suffered by the plaintiffs.10 6 In doing so, the court
recognized that wind access had an identifiable value to the
7
plaintiffs.10
In addition, obstruction of a renewable resource for personal energy needs may constitute an actionable private nuisance.10 8 In Prah
v. Maretti, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of a
landowner's claim to enjoin a neighbor from constructing a building
that would block sunlight from the landowner's solar energy system. 10 9 In reaching its decision, the court noted the societal interests
100. Id. at 277-78 (discussing why wind power rights are severable and sustainable).
101. Id. at 277.
102. Id. The defendant had leased a significant portion of the tract for a wind energy project
that was home to 260 electricity generating wind turbines. Id. at 274. The defendant's decision
to lease the right to develop a wind farm on the property to a third party undermined the defen-

dant's argument that the wind power rights were not severable from the fee simple estate. See
id. According to the defendant, the lost income from the wind lease would have been added to
the damages award that arose from the condemnation of the property. See id.

103. 80 S.W. 120, 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904).
104. See id. at 121.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. In order to prevail, the injured party must show that the adjoining landowner's obstruction of sunlight unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land. See
Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 190-91 (Wis. 1982) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 827, 816, 829 (1977)).
109. Prah, 321 N.W.2d at 184.
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in furthering the development of alternative energy sources, as well as
federal and state efforts to promote solar energy. 110 The court analogized the obstruction of sunlight to the interference with the flow of
surface waters, which is actionable conduct under traditional tort
law.1" The court justified the application of the surface water doctrine by reasoning that traditional nuisance law' 1 2 was an appropriate
means of protecting access to sunlight and other landowner's development rights. 1

3

Conversely, in O'Neill v. Brown, the Appellate Court

of Illinois refused to enjoin the defendant from constructing an addition to his house that would partially prevent sunlight from reaching
the plaintiff's greenhouse." 4 The court rejected the proposition that
one has a right to the free flow of light and air under either the com5
mon law or Illinois's Solar Energy Act of 1989."
D. General Scope of Doctrinal Rights in Natural Resources

The right to appropriate wind over one's land for personal use is
largely undefined." 6 Generally, legal rights for the allocation of a resource are well-defined, and they influence the use, exclusion, and

transfer of the particular resource. 117 Defining rights with respect to
wind energy in the context of obstruction or interference "requires a
consideration of the nature of the resource and of analogous bodies of
law, 1" 8 such as those that govern wild animals, solar energy, minerals,
oil and gas, and water."19
110. Id. at 189 n.11.
111. Id.at 190.
112. The Wisconsin Supreme Court employed the reasonable use doctrine as set forth by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. See id. at 190-92 (examining the gravity of harm and utility of
the conduct to assess whether the plaintiff had stated a nuisance claim).
113. Id. at 191 ("Private nuisance law is better suited to regulate access to sunlight in modern
society and is more in harmony with legislative policy and the prior decisions of this court.").
114. 609 N.E.2d 835, 839 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993).
115. The court held that the Solar Energy Act did not create solar skyspace easements for
solar collectors. Id. at 841 (discussing the Comprehensive Solar Energy Act of 1977).
116. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
117. Gisser & Johnson, supra note 18, at 139.
118. Smith, supra note 6, at 300.
119. Each theory generally addresses the right to capture the resource for one's use. Id. (proposing that percolating water, wild animal, oil and gas, and mineral theories may best define
rights to wind and that the prevailing laws within a particular jurisdiction inform which theory to
follow); see also COlT, supra note 24, at 11 (remarking that water and sunlight rights may be
appropriate models for wind rights theory); cf. Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc.,
68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272, 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (agreeing with the trial court's analogy of the
harnessing of wind to the pumping of subsurface oil and gas).
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The laws of wild animals and percolating waters have been suggested as analogous doctrines. 120 However, unlike wind, wild animals
belong to the state and have no value-that is, there is no property
interest-until such animals are lawfully domesticated. 2 1 Rights to
percolating waters rest primarily with the owner of the surface estate
who can lawfully capture as much water as he wishes, even to the det22
riment of adjoining landowners, "absent malice or willful waste.'
The utility of analogizing these doctrines to wind rights is questionable
because issues involving wild animals and percolating waters presuppose that the object of capture is subject to ownership prior to its effective capture. Furthermore, wind is not reduced to possession to
a more
realize its value. Thus, wind rights should be analogized to
123
application.
general
to
suited
more
is
that
familiar doctrine
Less arcane models such as oil, gas, and mineral rights doctrines
have also been suggested as useful parallels to wind rights. 124 However, while an ample body of law governs the allocation of these resources, 125 these resources must also be reduced to possession in order
to realize their inherent value; although these doctrines are familiar to
the legal system and may inform some disputes over developer competition, they will not address problems of obstruction 126 or turbine
wake interference. 2 7 Furthermore, unlike oil, gas, and minerals,
which are scarce and non-renewable-and for that reason intensely
u2 8
disputed-wind is "intangible and completely renewable.'
Solar doctrine, if it can be credited as an independent doctrine, originally developed by analogy to common law prior appropriation and
property theory.' 29 Theories of easement, implied easement, mali120. Terry E. Hogwood, Against the Wind, 26 No. 2 OIL, GAS AND ENERGY RESOURCES SECTION REP., STATE BAR OF TEX. 6 (Dec. 2001); see also Smith, supra note 6, at 300 (discussing
Hogwood, supra and Texas state law with respect to the ownership of wild animals).
121. Hogwood, supra note 120, at 8 (describing Texas wild animal ownership law).
122. Id. at 10 (quoting Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 76 (Tex.
1999)).
123. See Rule, supra note 7, at 213-14. Troy Rule remarks that the absence of regulatory case
and statutory law pertaining to wind rights provides legislatures with significant freedom in
drafting regulatory measures, and that stakeholders' interests would be best served by clear and
simple legislation. Id. The clearest and simplest laws are generally those with which people are
most well-acquainted; therefore, a familiar theory with minor adjustments should anchor a
framework devised to address the existing uncertainties of wind rights.
124. See, e.g., Contra Costa Water Dist., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 278.
125. Smith, supra note 6, at 305.
126. Id. at 306.
127. See generally Rule, supra note 7 (articulating a method to solve wake interference
problems suffered by downwind turbines caused by the siting of an upwind turbine).
128. See id. at 232-33.
129. See Jay M. Zittler, Annotation, Solar Energy: Landowner's Rights Against Interference
with Sunlight Desired for Purposes of Solar Energy, 29 A.L.R. 4TH 349, 350 (1984). The prior
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ciously erected "spite structures," zoning rules, and nuisance have
been advanced as a means to resolving disputes over access to sunlight
for solar energy. 130 Property rights are certainly no stranger to the
courts, and they require the attention of anyone who seeks to craft or
identify rights in wind.
Troy Rule recently proposed that wind rights should look to "Rule
Four" of Calabresi and Melamed's "Cathedral Model" to resolve disputes between competing wind energy developers.13 1 Rule Four allows an "agitator" to continue to behave in the agitating manner
unless the victim compensates the agitator for the cessation of the activity. 132 Troy Rule suggests that under Calabresi and Melamed's
Rule Four, an upwind turbine may continue to operate, despite the
economic injury of the turbine's "wake effects" on a downwind energy
operator. 133 The turbine may only be stilled to eliminate its adverse
effects on downstream turbines if the downwind operator purchases
the upwind turbine owner's entitlement to operate. 134 Troy Rule acknowledges two problems with his proposition: (1) Rule Four is infrequently applied in private disputes,1 35 and (2) its mechanics, when
applied to wind, depend primarily on whether a wind operator is upwind or downwind of his competition.1 36 Application of the doctrine
overemphasizes whether a wind operator is situated upstream or
downstream of the interference or obstruction because a victim of
wind deprivation will always be situated downwind of the source of
interference. Furthermore, because wind changes direction with frequency, interference with wind reception may originate from different
adjoining landowners at different times. Moreover, the Rule Four
proposal does not place enough emphasis on landowners' rights to
appropriation doctrine as a basis for wind energy rights is discussed infra notes 246-57 and accompanying text.
130. Id. at 351. See, e.g., Sher v. Leiderman, 226 Cal. Rptr. 698, 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(claim asserted under the California Shade Control Act); Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182,
190-91 (Wis. 1982) (nuisance claim appropriate for deprivation of access to sunlight for solar
energy);
131. Rule, supra note 7, at 210-11 (suggesting that competition over wind rights is the problem that Calabresi and Melamed's Rule Four has been waiting for).
132. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1116 (1972).
133. Id. at 236. Wind turbines disrupt the flow of wind, which causes turbulence and reduces
the productivity of turbines that are situated downwind within a distance of up to a half mile for
commercial turbines. Rule, supra note 7, at 208-09. Small wind systems have drastically smaller
wake zones compared to their large commercial siblings, which will vastly reduce the likelihood
of a dispute over lost productivity between neighbors with small wind systems. Id.
134. Id. at 236.
135. Id. at 211.
136. Id. at 219.
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lawful enjoyment and the exercise of development rights.1 37 Although
the concepts inherent in a wind rights doctrine that is modeled upon a
real property framework would be familiar to the legal system, the
doctrine ignores wind's use as an energy source and the legal implications that attach.
Identifying a substance as a resource suggests that the substance has
an inherent value, and given that society has a general interest in natural resources, it influences the treatment of that substance by imparting gravity into any situation where the rights to that substance
are at stake. As the intensity of calls for clean energy and energy
independence increases, wind must be acknowledged as an indispensable component of any energy plan. It follows that the potential and
existing use of wind as an energy resource should be addressed by a
doctrine that regulates its allocation.
1.

Obstruction of and Interference with the Exercise of Water Rights

The rights to water use and appropriation are generally defined by
one of three doctrines: the riparian doctrine, the prior appropriation
doctrine, or a hybrid of both.138 Under the traditional theory of riparian rights, the rights to allocate water are inherent in the land and
cannot be waived for lack of activity.1 3 9 Under the law of prior appropriation, which developed as a result of the limited availability of
water sources in the western United States, 140 once a person uses any
137. The theory discredits the notion of "first in time, first in right" and reaches for results
based primarily on economic efficiency and a particular society's preferred method for wealth
distribution. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 132, at 1093-1105.
138. See GETCHES, supra note 30, at 3. This Comment focuses on the riparian and prior appropriation doctrines and the contributions that each can make to the formation of a small wind
access rights theory. Discussion of hybrid models drawn from riparian and prior appropriation
theories is beyond the scope of this Comment due to the complexity and multitude of variations
of those theories.
139. Id. at 4.
140. Id. at 5. The doctrine spread throughout the West in order to foster settlement and industry. See id. at 82. Most states that govern water allocation by the law of prior appropriation
began first as riparian states. Id. at 193. The reason for adopting the appropriation doctrine was
summarized by the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada:
This change is the natural outgrowth of the conditions existing in this state. The climate
is dry. The soil is arid. The land is unproductive, without irrigation. When water can
be used thereon, it becomes capable of successful cultivation. There are but few
streams of water. The benefits accruing to land along the banks of these streams by the
mere flow of water in the channel is very slight. The bottom lands that can be irrigated
by a diversion of the water, so that it can be turned back into the stream, are of limited
extent. A large proportion of the area of land suitable for cultivation would have to
remain in its wild and unproductive state, covered only by the natural growth of sagebrush and greasewood, unless the right to appropriate and divert the water of the
streams away from the channel for the purpose of irrigating such lands is recognized
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water from a source in compliance with state law, he has perfected his
right to draw water from that source; this right remains valid as long
41
as the use continues.1
a.

Riparian Rights and the Reasonable Use Doctrine

The doctrine of riparian rights arose during the Industrial Revolution, spurred by new water uses and the associated problems of pollution and excessive consumption. 42 Riparian rights generally attach to
land that borders a watercourse or lake.1 43 Ownership of such land,
referred to as "riparian land," 144 historically granted each riparian
owner the right to the natural, undiminished flow and quality of
water. 145 However, strict riparianism "was impractical and seemed to
bar any consumption of water" because any consumption of water
naturally diminishes the natural flow of water, and it later gave way to
the reasonable use theory. 146 Under the reasonable use doctrine, riparian owners are still generally entitled to an undiminished flow of
water, but instead of a strict application of this rule to obstructions
and interferences, the reasonable use doctrine requires the courts to
weigh each party's use and interests. 147 The Restatement (Second) of
and secured. The same conditions exist with reference to the necessity for the use of
the water for mining, milling, mechanical, manufacturing, municipal, and other beneficial purposes. These conditions and the growing wants and necessities of the people
imperatively demanded that such a change should be made. Riparian rights are
founded upon the ancient doctrine of the common law. If the law is a progressive
science, courts should keep pace with the progress and advancement of the age, and
constantly bear in mind the wants and necessities of the people, and the peculiar conditions and surroundings of the country in which they live.
Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Dangberg, 81 F. 73, 92-93 (D. Nev. 1897).
141. See GETCHES, supra note 30, at 74.
142. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS div. 10, ch. 41, topic 3 (1939).
143. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 843 cmt. b (1979) (noting that among
riparian rights, aside from the privilege to take water for certain purposes, is the right to object
to the unprivileged taking and obstructing of water flow by others).
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 843 cmt. d (1979).
145. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS div. 10, ch. 41, topic 3 (1939).
146. GETCHES, supra note 30, at 4. The evolution from strict riparianism, which sought to
preserve undiminished water flow for each riparian owner, to the reasonable use theory was
influenced by "climate,... economic development, and inherited legal theory." 1 ROBERT E.
BECK & AMY K. KELLY, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.01(b), at 7-15 (repl. ed. 2007). But cf.
Pat Boone, Jr., State Claims in Texas Stream Waters, 28 TEX. L. REV. 931, 947 (1950) (arguing
that the reasonable use doctrine is unworkable and advocating for the application of the beneficial use doctrine to water use issues).
147. "A riparian proprietor is subject to liability for making an unreasonable use of the water
of a watercourse or lake that causes harm to another riparian proprietor's reasonable use of
water or his land." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 (1979). In 1888, the Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut noted that the riparian doctrine was grounded upon the golden
rule of law that "no one may so use his own as to injure the property of another," and that the
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Torts sets forth a multi-factored analysis to determine the reasonableness of a riparian's water use:
(a) [t]he purpose of the use, (b) the suitability of the use to the
watercourse or lake, (c) the economic value of the use, (d) the social
value of the use, (e) the extent and amount of the harm it causes, (f)
the practicality of avoiding the harm by adjusting the use or method
of use of one proprietor or the other, (g) the practicality of adjusting
the quantity of water used by each proprietor, (h) the protection of
existing values of water uses, land, investments, and enterprises, and
14 8
(i) the justice of requiring the user causing harm to bear the loss.
Under the Riparian Rights Doctrine, it is generally understood that
riparian owners may make a reasonable use of water, so long as that
use does not deprive similarly situated people of their rights.1 49 In
other words, a riparian proprietor has a right to use and enjoy the
water that naturally flows past or through his land, subject to the
rights of other riparian owners to reasonably use it for domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing purposes, regardless of whether they are
upstream or downstream of the subject property. 150
The determination of whether a riparian has wasted water and
thereby diminished or obstructed the downstream flow may rest on a
regulatory scheme.1 51 For example, in Romey v. Landers, an upstream
landowner constructed dams that pooled naturally flowing stream
1 52
water and diminished the downstream flow to the plaintiff's farm.
Although the construction of the dams seemed permissible by state
statute, 153 the court relied on a statutory exception that prohibited the
construction of dams if they interfered with the rights of other riparian
analysis of the reasonable use of the stream must be "adapted to the character and capacity of
the stream." Mason v. Hoyle, 14 A. 786, 788 (Conn. 1888).
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979). Note that "[tihe determination of
the reasonableness of a use of water depends upon a consideration of the interests of the riparian proprietor making the use, of any riparian proprietor harmed by it and of society as a
whole." Id.
149. See Okaw Drainage Dist. of Champaign & Douglas County Ill. v. Nat'l Distillers &
Chem. Corp., 882 F.2d 1241, 1246 (7th Cir. 1990).
150. See, e.g., Mentone Irrigation Co. v. Redlands Elec. Light & Power Co., 100 P. 1082 (Cal.
1909) (holding that an electric company acted within its rights in using a watercourse to generate
electricity); Jones v. Connecticut, 64 P. 855 (Or. 1901) (refusing to enjoin an upper riparian from
irrigating far reaches of an arid tract over the protests of a lower riparian); Lentz v. Carnegie
Bros. & Co., 23 A. 219 (Pa. 1892) (rejecting downstream plaintiff's claim against upstream company for damage caused by pollution).
151. See, e.g., Romey v. Landers, 392 N.W.2d 415 (S.D. 1986) (under a statute, construction of
earthen dams on an upstream landowner's property was permissible; however, the dams were
also impermissible under the same statute because they interfered with a downstream landowner's water rights).
152. Id. at 417.
153. Id. at 421-22 (internal citations omitted).
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owners. 1 54 Thus in Romey, the court found that the plaintiff had es55
tablished his water rights and was thereby entitled to relief.'
In general, the appropriation of water by mills and power plants is
considered a reasonable use as long as the flow to upstream and
downstream users is reasonably maintained. t 56 Unreasonable users

may be subject to injunctions or damages for interference with others'
water rights. 1 57 A downstream riparian may be entitled to damages

that are measured by the value of the potential use of the water as an
energy resource, even if the downstream owner did not operate a hydraulic mill.' 58 Yet where courts are confronted with a situation in
which construction of a hydroelectric dam harms other riparian owners, deference will be given to the state legislatures and Congress to

the extent that the advancement of social, environmental, and energy
policies are concerned. 159
154. Id. at 421-22 (internal citations omitted) (barring dam construction on nonnavigable
streams that interferes with vested rights)). The plaintiff's vested rights were also established by
statute.
155. Id. at 417 (plaintiff was entitled to relief for forced premature sale of cattle because of
insufficient water supply); see id. at 422 (remarking that South Dakota law stipulates that livestock watering establishes a vested right to use water).
156. See Callison v. Mount Shasta Power Corp., 11 P.2d 60, 62 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932)
(upholding an injunction that prohibited a power company from maintaining a dam and a tunnel
in a manner that interfered with the upstream water supply, but permitted the reasonable use of
water for generating electricity); see also Plumleigh v. Dawson, 6 Ill. (1 Gilm.) 544, 551 (1844)
(taking water from a stream is a reasonable use, so long as it does not unnecessarily damage
downstream riparians).
157. See, e.g., Plumleigh v. Dawson, 6 I11.(1 Gilm.) 544, 553 (1844) (actual or nominal damages available to downstream landowner); Romey v. Landers, 392 N.W.2d 415 (S.D. 1986) (defendant's construction of dams on a watercourse enjoined).
158. In Plumeigh v. Dawson, an upstream mill owner dammed a small stream, thereby reducing the flow to the downstream plaintiff by approximately twenty-five percent. 6 I11.(1 Gilm.) at
549. Although the downstream plaintiff had no hydraulic mill and the remaining flow was sufficient for agricultural and domestic use, the Supreme Court of Illinois found that "the stream,
which had been diverted, might be made valuable as a power, and that by its diversion, [the
plaintiff] was damaged." Id. at 551. The court observed that the upstream mill owner was allowed a reasonable use. Id. at 552.
159. See Carolina Power & Light Co. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 20 F. Supp. 854, 864 (E.D.S.C.
1937). The court stated,
The balancing of the damage to the riparian owners on the lower Santee against the
benefits to South Carolina at large, and to Columbia and Charleston in particular, is a
question of policy for the state Legislature, and it has spoken on this subject; its decree
thereabout has been approved by the highest state court. This seems to us to dispose of
all attempts to base the charge of illegality on the violation of any State Constitution or
statute. But, we think that the only common-sense view of the evidence compels us to
hold that, so far as the project involves navigation, it is a project which so substantially
affects interstate commerce as to be one over which Congress plainly has power of
control.
Id. at 864.
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Riparian rights can be waived. 160 For example, in Merrit v. Houlton
Water Co., the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine denied recovery to
mill operators that were harmed by the defendant's upstream diversion of water1 61 because the mill operators had known about the upstream diversion of water for several years but had failed to object to
it, and they had thus consented to the activity.1 62 Therefore, the plain163
tiff's implied waiver of riparian rights precluded recovery.
b.

Prior Appropriation

Unlike riparian theory, the doctrine of prior appropriation does not
confer a possessory interest in water upon the user; rather, it defines
the right to appropriate water as only usufructuary.1 64 The prior appropriation doctrine grants the right to capture and use water on a
"first come, first served" basis, subject to the availability of the resource.1 65 Unlike riparian rights, the right to appropriate water is not
contingent upon ownership or possession of land, and it is transferrable to the extent that the transfer does not harm other appropriators. 66 Once a water right is transferred, the new owner of the water
right is prohibited from enlarging the water right beyond the original
167
owner's use.
Under the traditional prior appropriation doctrine, an appropriator
has the right to divert and use water for a beneficial use. t68 Traditionally, to establish the right to divert and use water for irrigation or for
any other purpose, the purpose of the diversion must be economic,
beneficial, and reasonable.1 69 An excessive diversion of water for any
170
purpose cannot be regarded as a diversion for a beneficial use.
Under the appropriation theory, the obstruction of water from a se160. Annotation, Estoppel of One Riparian Owner to Complain of Diversion of Water by Another Riparian Owner, 74 A.L.R. 1129, 1133 (1931) (relief may be denied to a riparian owner for
diversion of water caused by another riparian "on grounds of equitable estoppels and laches
arising out of the consent or tacit acquiescence of the riparian owner in the erection of...
improvements by which the diversion was caused").
161. 76 A. 951, 951 (Me. 1910).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waters § 341 (2008). A life tenancy is the modern equivalent of a usufruct, whereby one has a right to "use and enjoy the fruits of another's property for a period
without damaging or diminishing it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1058 (8th ed. 2004).
165. GETCHES, supra note 30, at 75.

166. 45 AM. JuR. 2D Irrigation § 25 (2008).
167. Axtell v. M.S. Consulting, 955 P.2d 1362, 1368 (Mont. 1998).
168. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Irrigation § 25 (2008).

169. See, e.g., State Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1051 (Wash. 1993) (discussing
the relationship between waste and economic use).
170. Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Dangberg, 81 F. 73, 97 (D. Nev. 1897).
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nior appropriator 71 is actionable, and the actor may be liable to the
senior appropriator. 172 However, a mere change in the application of
the appropriated water or in the method or place of the diversion by
which the water is appropriated is within one's appropriative rights if
the water rejoins the watercourse at the same location, and if it does
not injure downstream users. 173 Moreover, once a water right is acquired through appropriation, the right must be continuously exer174
cised for a beneficial purpose or the holder risks abandonment:
Two elements are necessary for the abandonment of a water right:
nonuse of the water associated with the water right and intent to
abandon the water right. [E]vidence of a long period of continuous
nonuse of a water right raises a rebuttable presumption of an intent
to abandon that right and shifts the175burden of proof to the nonuser
to explain the reasons for nonuse.
The investigative nature required to apportion, classify, and validate
the use of water under the prior appropriation doctrine may be unduly
burdensome on state courts, and therefore, statutory provisions now
176
govern most water use in prior appropriation states.
III.

CHARTING THE COURSE OF WIND RIGHTS

The wide range of statutory incentives available to a small wind turbine operator is evidence that the public recognizes the social utility of
renewable energy applications for the individual. 17 7 Even with this in
171. A senior appropriator is a user who establishes a right to use water before a right is
established by another, junior user. 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waters § 360 (2009).
172. See GETCHES, supra note 30, at 75.

173. See Cline v. McDowell, 284 P.2d 1056, 1059 (Colo. 1955) (upholding decrees that allowed
the defendant to change the location from which water was appropriated from an irrigation
ditch).
174. Axtell, 955 P.2d at 1368.
175. Id. at 1369.
176. The Montana Supreme Court explains,
In Montana, prior to 1973, water rights were adjudicated according to the doctrine of
prior appropriation. Under this doctrine, a person could acquire an exclusive right to
use a specific amount of water by applying it to the land for a beneficial use, or, in other
words, "appropriating" the water. Prior appropriations had priority over later appropriations. Over time, as the number of appropriators claiming water rights in Montana
increased, the adjudication of these rights became cumbersome and complex. Finally,
in 1973, the Montana Legislature passed the Water Use Act (the Act), abolishing the
doctrine of prior appropriation and creating a new system of adjudicating water rights.
Axtell, 955 P.2d at 1367; see also Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 147 P.3d 20, 27-28
(Colo. 2006) ("The Water Rights Determination and Administration Act ... provides the statutory framework for implementing the constitutional right to divert the unappropriated waters of
any natural stream to beneficial uses."). However, for the purpose of defining a doctrinal framework to examine claims of right to appropriate wind, this Comment will explore only the basic,
traditional prior appropriation doctrine.
177. See Smith, supra note 6, at 295.
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mind, a court may enjoin a single wind turbine as a nuisance if a less
intrusive, viable renewable energy alternative is available. 178 To guard
against the enjoinment of personal wind turbines, an appropriative

right in the movement of air over one's property may be useful. 179 As
previously stated, the value in classifying the rights to wind as a right
to a natural resource may guide legislative regulation that protects
small wind operators against obstruction, diversion, or impairment of
winds.1 80 As a practical matter, it seems logical to define legal rights
to wind by comparing it to energy sources that have similar
characteristics.' 81
Wind is the movement of air, 18 2 and its most significant characteristic is that it cannot be depleted.18 3 Unlike wind, traditional energy
184
resources like oil, gas, and coal are available in finite quantities.
Although water-especially clean, fresh water-may be finite in
quantity, it is generally renewable as an energy source. 8 5 Arguably,
mankind's most valuable resource is water,1 8 6 which-due to the
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Pisauro, supra note 5, at 51 (calling for regulatory measures that will provide
certainty and that will avoid interference issues). However, any measures taken must be
grounded upon legal principles that provide sound footing and guidance for the measures
themselves.
180. Chavarria, supra note 21, at 834.
181. When they are not aided by legislative direction, courts draw analogies to laws governing
similar problems. See Comment, The Allocation of Sunlight: Solar Rights and the PriorAppropriation Doctrine, 47 U. CoLo. L. REV. 421, 427 (1976) [hereinafter Allocation of Sunlight].
182. Chavarria, supra note 21, at 835.
183. Joseph 0. Wilson, The Answer, My Friends,Is in the Wind Rights Contract Act: Proposed
Legislation Governing Wind Rights Contracts, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1775, 1783 (2004).
184. Estimates vary over the amount of conventional oil remaining that can be economically
extracted. See E.R. Behringer, Overview: Conventional Oil, http://www.physics.emich.edu/
ebehringer/FossilFuels/overview oil.html (last visited Jul. 11, 2009). The U.S. Department of
Energy's current estimate of available oil reserves as of January 1, 2008, is 1,332 billion barrels.
See Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Energy, International Energy Outlook 2008, http://
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/exce/figure_34data.xls (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). In 2005, sixty-three
percent of all coal mined was used for electricity production. Overall consumption of coal is
expected to increase from 1.7% to 2.6% per year up through 2030; the Department of Energy
projects that current coal reserves are approximately 930 billion tons. See Energy Info. Admin.,
U.S. Dep't of Energy, International Energy Outlook, 2008-Coal, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/
ieo/coal.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).
185. See Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong: The Case for a
National Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications for Policy, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. &
POL'Y J. 85, 135 (2008). An unrelated but staggering fact is that nearly forty percent of all
freshwater withdrawn for use in production of electricity is consumed by coal, natural gas, and
nuclear electric plants. Id. at 126.
186. Water is "indispensable to ... life and health." Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 210
(1901).
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shared physical characteristics of water and wind, 187 and each substance's classification as a resource-provides the best foundation
upon which a legal framework for wind rights can be constructed.
Wind rights have generally been viewed as derivative of or incidental to a fee ownership of real property. 188 This theory can be extended
to allow the possessor to "harvest" the wind from the airspace above
the surface estate by "extracting" the wind from the estate and thus
severing the ownership right to wind from the fee simple estate.1 89 An
important aspect of the use of wind as an energy resource, however, is
in the act of taking possession-or more simply, its appropriation for
use-which is a right that is not necessarily attached to the fee simple
estate. 190 Thus, like all other natural resources, wind rights should encompass property rights that are attached to an estate and appropriative rights that do not lie in the estate. 191
A.

Surface Estate-Based Component of Energy Resource Rights

Traditionally, the right to use wind that is attached to a particular
piece of property constitutes one facet of a landowner's rights, and it
does not require a separate "possessory" right to the wind. 192 After
all, wind is the movement of air, and the air above the surface of one's
land, in terms of the most traditional property theories, is owned by
the titleholder of the surface estate. 193 An analogy to riparian rights
may help explain a property owner's wind rights. 194 A riparian's right
to enjoy and use water is derived from ownership of the land estate; a
riparian has the right to use water from an adjacent watercourse or
body of water to the extent that downstream users are not adversely
187. Rule, supra note 7, at 214 n.24 (noting that although wind and water are fugitive substances, the position of each is predictable).
188. See Wilson, supra note 183, at 1784.
189. Id. at 1784. Wilson proposes that rights to appropriate the wind from the airspace or to
extract it from the estate are two separate theories that can be used to help define the rights. Id.
However, this Comment takes a broader view and combines the two ideas under the general
theory of property rights because the origin of each is physically related to the estate.
190. See Smith, supra note 6, at 301 (arguing that the right to "capture" wind is an ownership
interest with a nexus to the real property).
191. For example, a landowner has the right to drill for and extract oil and gas on his property,
even though it is drawn or flows from beneath the surface of an adjoining owner and diminishes
the flow of his neighbor's wells that were dug prior to his. See 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals
§ 142 (2008).
192. Smith, supra note 6, at 301.
193. See Chavarria, supra note 21, at 834 ("How can one 'possess' or own the movement of
air?").
194. A similar approach with respect to solar rights was explored in Allocation of Sunlight,
supra note 181.
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affected. 195 Applying a similar line of reasoning, a small wind energy
system owner would have the right to use wind for personal purposes,
arising from the situation of his land and the mere fact that wind
passes over his land, much like a riparian's right to use water that
196
flows on, through, or next to his property.
It is worth noting that the water that a riparian is entitled to use

does not need to exist directly on the surface estate; 197 rather, the ri-

1 98
parian may use any watercourse that runs adjacent to his property.
When this theory is applied to wind, it can be distinguished from the
traditional theory of owning the airspace above one's estate up to the
heavens. 199 Instead of considering wind as "property" of one estate, it
would be the communal "property" of similarly situated landowners
who share the wind's path of travel. 200 Applying the riparian theory,
it is unlikely that a wind appropriator's small wind energy system
would be an excessive, unreasonable use that prevents other similarly
situated landowners from using the resource. 20 1 In this respect, ripa-

rian rights to appropriate water are distinguishable from rights to ap20 2
propriate oil, gas, and minerals.

195. See supra notes 142-146 and accompanying text.
196. Smith posits a similar theory that is grounded on oil and gas law. See Smith, supra note 6,
at 301-03. "The right to use or benefit from the wind that blows across one's land might well be
considered an incident of land ownership, analogous to the right to extract oil and gas in nonownership jurisdictions." Id. at 302.
197. In oil and gas law, the landowner may drill and extract oil on his property. See Brown v.
Spillman, 155 U.S. 665, 669-70 (1895); see also 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gas and Oil § 6 (2009) (recognizing that a right to extract oil from beneath a landowner's tract is limited only by the grant of the
same rights to another party).
198. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
200. Riparian rights are incidental to the estate because they do not necessarily exist "on" the
estate. See

CLESSON

S. KINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS

760 (2d ed. 1912). Under the riparian doctrine, rights to use the water depend upon the land
being contiguous to the watercourse; it is of no consequence whether the real property has a
vertical or lateral relationship to the watercourse or body. See David B. Anderson, Water Rights
as Property in Tulare v. United States, 38 McGEORGE L. REV. 461, 481 (2007) (explaining that
the right to use water "arises because, as a practical matter,.... land's natural, physical contiguity
to the stream affords access to the flowing water").
201. See Carolina Power & Light Co. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 20 F. Supp. 854, 864 (E.D.S.C.
1937) (holding that the benefits of a hydroelectric plant must be weighed against harm to other
riparians).
202. Although water, oil, and gas are fugitive substances, a landowner has the right to "capture" oil and gas beneath his land, even if the oil or gas is drawn from reservoirs beneath neighboring lands. 1 EUGENE KuNrz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS: BEING A REVISION
OF THORNTON ON OIL AND GAS § 4.1, at 112 (1987). With respect to riparian rights, one riparian's appropriation of water cannot injure another riparian's right to the same. See GETCHES,
supra note 30, at 4.
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Allowable Use Limits and the Reasonable Use Doctrine

When wind is used to generate electricity, it is never reduced to
possession; the same amount of air resides in the atmosphere before
and after the breeze spins the blades of a turbine. 20 3 This is similar to
the use of moving water to generate electricity at hydroelectric
plants. 20 4 Hydroelectric power, like wind, is generally considered a
clean, renewable energy source. 20 5 Once water has passed a hydroelectric dam, it continues downstream within its water course. Similarly, wind passing through a turbine will carry past the owner's
surface estate to the lands beyond. 20 6 Applying the general rule that a
riparian owner can make a reasonable use of water to the extent that
it does not interfere with the use of water by similarly situated downstream landowners, it follows that small wind energy producers would
be entitled to use wind to generate their own electricity if they do not
20 7
interfere with the reasonable use of wind by downwind owners.
Riparian rights at common law have largely been modified by statutory limitations. 208 To define what would constitute a reasonable use
of the wind, it is necessary to understand the uses that have been per-

mitted under the reasonable use doctrine. The use of water to produce electricity has been viewed as a reasonable and proper use
arising from a riparian right, although the determination that a partic0 9
ular installation constitutes a reasonable use is largely fact-based. 2
203. See Chavarria, supra note 21, at 834. ("The concept of wind ownership is difficult to
comprehend because one cannot capture or possess [it] to the exclusion of others.").
204. Hydroelectric plants use turbines that are turned by moving water to generate electricity.
See PAUL KRUGER, ALTERNATIVE ENERGY RESOURCES: THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE

EN-

ERGY 140-41 (2006).

205. Id. at 140. However, hydroelectric power plants cause silting, which in turn poses environmentally adverse consequences. Id. at 142.
206. In commercial applications, the wake or disturbance caused by wind turbines can impact
the productivity of downwind wind turbines. See Rule, supra note 7, at 208.
207. Downwind landowners may be a dynamic group, unlike downstream riparian owners
who are situated along a watercourse. While the direction of travel for water in a watercourse is
generally channeled by physical constraints, the direction in which the wind blows is continually
changing.
208. See Joseph Dellapenna, Developing a Suitable Water Allocation Law for Pennsylvania, 17
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 23 (2006) ("Regulated riparianism has ... displace[d] traditional riparian
rights.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
209. State statutes broadly indicate what applications constitute reasonable uses of water.
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (water taken under riparian right must be put to beneficial use,
and such a taking must be "exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in
the interest of the people and for the public welfare"); ALA. CODE § 33-7-51 (2008) (prohibiting
maintenance on and building of structures that would unreasonably obstruct the use of navigable
waters); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-8-1 (2008) (prohibiting any diversion or use that interferes with
others); IOWA CODE § 464B.25 (2004) (stating that waterfalls created by a proprietor using water
power to propel machinery are a reasonable exercise of riparian rights); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
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For example, in Callison v. Mount Shasta Power Corp., this determina-

tion turned on whether the power company's use of water was reasonable in light of its "correlative share of ... water ..

for riparian...

purposes. ' 210 Thus, after engaging in a fact-specific inquiry, the court
concluded that the use did not unnecessarily or disproportionately dis211
advantage other riparian users.

In actuality, the risks posed by downwind and upwind property

owners are not reciprocal with respect to obstructing airflow-the upwind owner poses a risk to the small wind energy user. 2 12 It is difficult
to see how a small wind user could unnecessarily, disproportionately,

or adversely interfere with downwind users in the exercise of their
appropriation or use of wind because the wind is not reduced to possession by a wind turbine. 213 Rather, with wind, the problem is that an
upwind property owner will erect a house or structure that will obstruct or impede the naturally occurring flow of air to a private wind
turbine. An object such as a building situated on neighboring prop2 4
erty can disrupt airflow for a distance of twenty times its height. 1
Although the upwind landowner is not "using" the wind for any constructive purposes, the obstruction deprives the downwind small wind
energy user of his right to the wind. 215 Viewed under the doctrine of
§ 481:12 (2001) (prohibiting the unlawful use of a waterflow stored for power or other judicially
approved use); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.1 (1990) (water use for household purposes is reasonable; water use for agricultural purposes must be de minimus); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1031

(1995) (snow-making is a reasonable use). Thus, the determination of what specific activities
constitute reasonable use falls to the courts. Although many statutes do not provide a per se
stamp of approval upon energy generation as a reasonable use of water, courts generally recognize it as a reasonable use. See, e.g., Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 23 (1885) ("One
reasonable use of the water is the use of the power, inherent in the fall of the stream and the
force of the current, to drive mills."). But see Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607,
618 (Cal. 1926) ("The production of power upon riparian land was a proper riparian use of the
waters flowing thereon, even though the power and energy so developed was to be conveyed
away and used at distant points not riparian to such lands.") (citation omitted). However, the
Herminghaus court enjoined a power company from constructing dams and reservoirs that
downstream riparians alleged would interfere with their riparian rights by disrupting their ability
to irrigate their lands. See id. at 611.
210. 11 P.2d 60, 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932).
211. Id.
212. A similar problem was recognized at the advent of residential solar energy applications.
See Allocation of Sunlight, supra note 181, at 422.
213. Turbulence is created by the spinning of the blades, which in the case of a small wind
energy system is negligible, but "[t]he turbulence generated by the spinning rotors of thousands
of large wind turbines on a farm in the southern Great Plains could cause changes in local meteorological conditions." Kris Christen, Turbulence on the Wind Farm, ENVTL. ScI. & TECH. ONLINE, Jan. 19, 2005, http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/journals/esthag-w/2005/jan/tech/kc-turbulence.
html.
214. PAUL GIPE, WIND ENERGY 271 (2004).
215. This situation may be analogous to "spite fences." See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 3817 (2008) ("A person shall not erect or maintain an unnecessary fence or other structure for
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riparian rights, the total or substantial blockage of airflow may be
unreasonable.
Several states have either adopted the Restatement (Second) of
Torts or employed similar analyses to resolve riparian reasonable use
issues.2 1 6 Viewed through the lens of riparian rights, the small wind
energy user could demonstrate that the upwind owner's development
of his property deprives him of the flow of wind, and that it constitutes
an unreasonable use of the resource. However, economically, the upwind landowner will likely prevail on the analysis of the value of the
use. 217 The remaining factors will require a rigorous analysis of the
facts and policy issues, and they could perhaps influence an outcome
218
favorable to the small wind operator.
a.

Purpose of the Use

The first factor used by courts when determining the reasonableness
of obstructions weighs the competing purposes for which each landowner uses the wind. Drawing an analogy to water rights, the appropriation of water to produce electricity is a reasonable exercise of
one's riparian rights.219 Thus, by comparison, the appropriation of
22 0
wind to generate electricity should be considered a reasonable use.
the purpose of annoying the owners of adjoining property by obstructing their view or depriving
them of light or air.").
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A. The Restatement has been influential in a
wide variety of jurisdictions, and Illinois is among the states that have incorporated § 850A into
law. See, e.g., Okaw Drainage Dist. of Champaign & Douglas County v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem.
Corp., 882 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir. 1989). But see, e.g., Lopardo v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 97 F.3d 921
(7th Cir. 1996) (remarking on the similarity between reasonable use and nuisance doctrines, and
ultimately adhering to a nuisance framework). Various states, situated differently with respect to
the availability of fresh water, have explicitly adopted § 850A in whole or in part. Examples
include Michigan, Hawaii, Ohio, Oklahoma, Massachusetts, Georgia, Nevada, and Missouri.
See, e.g., Pyle v. Gilbert, 265 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. 1980); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d
409 (Haw. 2000); Lummis v. Lilly, 429 N.E.2d 1146 (Mass. 1982); Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., 709 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005); Ripka v.
Wansing, 589 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Clark County v. Powers, 611 P.2d 1072 (Nev.
1980); McNamara v. Rittman, 707 N.E.2d 967 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); Franco-Am. Charolaise,
Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990) (recognizing that the majority of the
states have adopted the Restatement's view of reasonable use). But see Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods,
Inc., 513 P.2d 627, 634-35 (Idaho 1973) (exploring but rejecting the reasonable use doctrine, in
keeping with Idaho's traditional application of the prior appropriation and beneficial use
doctrines).
217. The value of a house or other permanent structure is likely greater than that of a small
wind energy device and the value of the energy created from it. See supra notes 12-14 and
accompanying text.
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A cmts. a-m (1979).
219. See Callison v. Mount Shasta Power Corp., 11 P.2d 60, 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932).
220. See, e.g., City of Ormond Beach v. State, 426 So. 2d 1029, 1032 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(demonstrating the social value of renewable energy technologies by declaring that a "[c]ity may
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Although the purpose of using wind for energy production may be
presumptively reasonable, the actual use of the wind or land must be
reasonable with respect to the surrounding landowners who have di-

rect or indirect interests in the wind or land that is frustrated by the
wind energy system. 22 1 Therefore, a degree of compatibility and suit-

ability is required between the subject use and the use of surrounding
land.222 The right to develop one's property as one sees fit is a funda-

mental principle of property law. 223 Thus, the actions of an adjoining
landowner that threaten to block wind, but that arise from the owner's
lawful use and enjoyment of his property, will probably be found to

originate from a reasonable purpose, to the extent that the actions are
in compliance with local land use laws and are not spiteful. 224 With

these countervailing considerations, an analysis of the use factor may
not lead to a determinative finding for either the small wind energy

operator or the neighbor who threatens to obstruct the flow of air.225
b. Suitability of the Use to the Location
The next factor that a court addresses when determining the reasonableness of an obstruction is whether one landowner's or both landowners' activities correspond to the physical properties of the land
and area, as well as the outlying community. This factor may also be
non-determinative if both landowners can establish some suitable use
not restrict or prohibit the construction and maintenance of [a] renewable energy source" in
accordance with a state statute).
221. Under the reasonable use doctrine, an upstream user who is engaged in a valuable activity that deprives a downstream user of water for a questionably valuable activity for which other
means are more suitable would not be liable to the downstream user. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A cmt. a, illus. 1 (1979) (giving the example of a situation in which an
upstream riparian's use of water to irrigate crops, although it deprives a downstream user of the
ability to drown gophers, is reasonable with respect to the other riparian).
222. See infra Part III.A.l.b.
223. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 352
(2002) (noting the caveat that development rights are "subject to the reasonable exercise of state
authority").
224. Id. The determination of whether an improvement constitutes a nuisance to a neighbor
will turn on whether the offending neighbor's actions were spiteful. "[W]hat makes a spite fence
a nuisance ... is not merely that it obstructs the passage of light and air, but that it does so
unnecessarily for the malicious purpose of annoyance." Wilson v. Handley, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d
263, 271 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
225. Both enjoyment of one's property and clean energy production are recognized as beneficial uses of land. See, e.g., In re Halnon, 811 A.2d 161, 163 (Vt. 2002) (discussing whether a
proposed small wind energy project would "violate a clear, written community standard intended to preserve the aesthetics" of the area; "offend the sensibilities of the average person"; or
whether the project owners "failed to take generally available mitigating steps that a reasonable
person would take to improve the harmony of the proposed project with its surroundings").
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that does not offend local zoning regulations or customs. 226 In order
to satisfy the suitability factor, the wind operator must show that he
expects a reasonable level of benefit from the location. The installation of a windmill in a location where winds are neither strong nor
constant enough to generate more than a meager amount of electricity, for example, will likely weigh against the small wind energy operator. 2 27 Rassier v. Houim illustrates the suitability factor. In Rassiera case involving a private nuisance claim-the Supreme Court of
North Dakota declined to enjoin the owner of a windmill from continuing its use 228 because the installation of the windmill on property
amid lots intended for residential development did not defeat the assertion that the windmill was suitable for the location.2 29 This inquiry
is malleable according to the sensitivities of the sitting judge. 230 This
demonstrable malleability, while it may prove unpredictable at first
blush, allows for conclusions on suitability to reflect the values of the
jurisdiction.
c.

The Extent and Amount of the Harm Caused by the
Obstruction

The third factor considered by a court when determining the reasonableness of an obstruction is the extent of harm suffered by the
plaintiff. The extent of harm suffered by a windmill owner arising
from the obstruction of air flow may require a showing of hardship
and injury. 23 1 For example, a prospective windmill operator who was
denied a variance from local setback and height limitations prevailed
at trial in Ormond Beach v. State on the assertion that "his only hardship was to attempt to save electricity. ' '232 On appeal, the District
226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A cmt. d (1979) (noting that the determination should consider customary methods of obtaining the benefits of water use).
227. See Patricia E. Salkin, Wind Power, in 1 AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9:51, at 9-161
(2008).
228. 488 N.W.2d 635, 638-39 (S.D. 1992).
229. The court did not premise its ruling on suitability of the location. Instead, the defendant
prevailed because the plaintiff came to the nuisance and the windmill did not interfere with the
enjoyment of the plaintiff's property. Id. at 638.
230. Id. at 640 (Meschke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the
majority's position that installation of the windmill did not betray the "character of the locality
at the time that the interfering activity [began]"). The dissent observed that because the intended use of the property was residential prior to its development, "Houim's wind turbine on
part of his lot was not well suited to this residential locale. On the other hand, [plaintiff's] use of
her property for a residence [was] well suited to the character of the locale." Id. at 640-41
(Meschke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
231. See City of Ormond Beach v. State, 426 So. 2d 1029, 1032 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
232. Id. at 1032 (ruling that the petitioner's request for a variance to a zoning stipulation that
would hinder operation of his planned wind turbine was reasonable and should be granted).
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Court of Appeal of Florida held that the hardship requirement would
be satisfied if the plaintiff was prohibited from erecting the windmill,
but he would otherwise have to show that the local setback and height
restrictions made satisfactory performance of the wind turbine
233
impossible.
Courts might employ a reasonableness standard to determine
whether satisfactory performance of an installation can be realized
and ultimately whether a wind operator has been subjected to undue
hardship. 234 For example, in MississippiPower Co. v. Goudy, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that an electric utility "has the unquestioned right under our law to receive a fair and reasonable return for
the services it renders. '235 Therefore, an obstruction that eliminates a
small wind energy operator's expected return on investment may
show that the obstruction prevents satisfactory performance and
causes hardship because the operator should expect lower, if not eliminated, conventional electricity costs, in addition to a reduced carbon
footprint. 236 The courts will have system performance, electricity
costs, and other data at their disposal to assess the expected return
and hardship.
It is easy to show that a neighbor's planned development will obstruct the flow of wind to an operating wind energy system and
thereby harm the turbine owner. System purchase and installation
costs, as well as costs avoided by reducing or eliminating the need for
conventionally supplied electricity, clearly exemplify the extent of
harm caused as a result of wind obstruction. 237 Rather than the economic benefits provided by the small wind system, perhaps the greater
value to all small wind operators is the reduced environmental impact
provided by the system's implementation. 238 This particular facet of
the analysis is best considered in light of its social utility.

233. Id.
234. See Miss. Power Co. v. Goudy, 459 So. 2d 257, 270-72 (Miss. 1984).
235. Id. at 271.
236. See Galbraith, supra note 14, at C9 (a modest private wind turbine is capable of generating enough electricity to justify the cost, while a smaller one may be a cross between a "hobby
and an environmental fashion statement").
237. Energy savings costs can be shown by calculating the amount of energy the system produces and then assigning the going market rate for electricity to that quantity. Electric bills
received preceding and following system installation will also show the economic benefits that
the small wind system provides to the owner.
238. See Galbraith, supra note 14, at C9.
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Economic and Social Value of the Use

The fourth factor analyzed by courts when determining the reasonableness of an obstruction is the economic and societal value of the use.
The economic and social value of the wind turbine installation must
be examined in light of the community's needs. Given the current
statutory trend of recognizing the social value in promoting development and implementation of renewable energy devices, this factor
239
may weigh in favor of the individual wind energy system owner.
For example, the implementation of wind energy technologies reduces
the amount of carbon dioxide that is released into the atmosphere
throughout the production of electricity. 240 From a social economic
standpoint, it can be argued that the small wind operator is shouldering at least his personal share of the burden in reducing pollution and
that because he is investing his capital in wind-generated electricity,
he should be given a certain amount of deference under the analysis
of the economic and social use factor.
e.

Practicality of Avoiding the Harm

The fifth factor analyzed by courts when determining the reasonableness of obstructions is the practicality of avoiding the harm. When
property development and wind access are at odds, each party to the
dispute must act in a manner that conforms to local regulations and
that does not unduly harm neighbors. Guidance on this issue can be
found in City of Ormond Beach v. State, where a small wind proprietor sought a variance from zoning height and setback requirements to
achieve maximum efficiency. 24 1 The court required the windmill operator to investigate whether he could comply with the applicable land
use restrictions and still maintain satisfactory system operations
before seeking a variance. 242 Likewise, a neighbor who proposes to
install a structure or object that will interfere with the wind flow to an
operating windmill should bear the burden of investigating alternate
locations and configurations that will not interfere with the windmill
owner's use and enjoyment of the property. 243 The practicality of adjusting resource consumption may favor the obstructed small wind en239. See supra notes 63-97 and accompanying text.
240. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, SMALL WIND TURBINE GLOBAL MARKET STUDY 2008, at 5
(2008) (each 50 MW of installed wind energy capacity amounts to a carbon dioxide displacement
of 60,000 tons per year).
241. 426 So. 2d 1029, 1030 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
242. Id,at 1032.
243. See generally Romey v. Landers, 392 N.W.2d 415 (S.D. 1986) (analyzing the interference
with water flow from upstream neighbor's earthen dams). See also Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d
182 (Wis. 1982) (involving the obstruction of sunlight from private solar panels).
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ergy operator if the turbine was erected prior to the neighbor's
planned development, and the neighbor can situate his development
in such a way that it does not interfere with the wind turbine. However, in the event that the two activities cannot coexist, the late-coming developer may need to bear the costs of relocating or modifying
the wind turbine, thereby preventing the development from adversely
impacting the wind turbine's operation.
f. Protecting Existing Investments
The sixth factor that courts consider when determining the reasonableness of an obstruction is the protection of existing investments.
Balancing the value and utility of wind power, land, and other investments and enterprises will likely be a strenuous fact-based inquiry.
The Court must consider the economic value of the land, the nature of
each party's possession of the land, the traditional land use rights, and
the implications of renewable energy use and development. 244 An important consideration may be the wind energy operator's expectations
of and adherence to local regulations and relevant statutory provisions
that were enacted at the time the system was installed. 245 Results will
vary by occurrence due to the fact-dependent nature of the analysis.
2.

Riparian-BasedRights Conclusion

In sum, a riparian-based theory allows one to appropriate or use the
wind that blows across his property so long as others are not adversely
impacted by the appropriation or use. When conflicts arise, the theory considers the specific facts and policies at stake to determine
which use will prevail. In that sense, the theory recognizes an incidental right, not a possessory right, to appropriate the wind. The inherent
balancing approach resembles the doctrines of public and private nuisance. But if the use of small wind energy systems is to be regulated
or controlled through the tort system, this rigorous inquiry could
prove taxing and produce inconsistent results. Moreover, legal fees
and court costs incurred through litigation may be too expensive to
warrant the investment, particularly for small wind owners. Thus, legislation is in order. This legislation must consider traditional notions
244. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A cmts. k-1 (1979) (noting that under water
doctrine the existing use of the water and property play a role in establishing whether a new use
is permissible and whether the existing practices have a priority over proposed uses).
245. See City of Ormond Beach, 426 So. 2d at 1031 (affirming in part and reversing in part a
trial court decision that awarded a prospective windmill operator attorney's fees and costs related to bringing a claim to obtain a zoning variance to allow a windmill at the optimum location
on the plaintiff's property in accordance with state statute).
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of property ownership and riparian rights in order to structure protec-

tion for and the encouragement of investment in small wind energy
systems.
B.

Use and Appropriation-BasedRights to Use Wind, Modeled on
the Theory of Prior Appropriation

The doctrine of prior appropriation, an alternate theory of water
rights allocation, may be less applicable in resolving wind rights issues. 246 The doctrine of prior appropriation resolves disputes between
competing water users on a first-come, first-served basis. 247 Under the
doctrine, water in its natural state is subject to state regulation until an
appropriator has reduced it to possession so that "no one shall be de-

nied his proper use and benefit of this common necessity. '248
However, the application of the doctrine of prior appropriation of
water to wind rights is limited by its fundamental principles. First, the
doctrine presupposes that appropriators are competing over the resource. 249 In the case of a landowner who obstructs wind access to a
neighbor's small wind energy turbine, competition over the resource is
not likely at issue; instead, the most heated issue concerns whether the
landowner's property rights in his neighbor's land trump the neighbor's property rights in the landowner's land. A neighbor who erects
a structure or plants a tree that deprives a windmill of wind does not

contemplate "use" of the wind in its traditional sense; each party has a
different interest in the use of the airspace. 250 The prior appropriation
246. The prior appropriation doctrine has been advocated as a means of protecting solar
rights. See Allocation of Sunlight, supra note 181, at 436 (favoring the application of the prior
appropriation doctrine over that of the riparian doctrine on the basis that prior appropriation
states "have more fully developed and consistent patterns of law than riparian states").
247. California even codified the principle with respect to priority of water use. See CAL. CiV.
CODE § 1414 (1872) (establishing priority of use "[a]s between applications, the one first in time
is the first in right"). But a concern with the doctrine is that if left unrestrained, adverse affects
will result from the decreased availability of resources. See James Huffman, Instream Water Use:
Public and Private Alternatives, in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 251 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1983) (advocating for state inter-

vention in the allocation of resources).
248. T.Richard Witmer, Comm. on Interior & Insular Aff., FederalWater Rights Legislationthe Problems and Their Background, in FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS LEGISLATION 26 (1960) (quot-

ing Walbridge v. Robinson, 125 P. 812, 814 (Idaho 1912)).
249. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
250. The obstructing party's interests lie in the development of his propert , but the small
wind operator's interests lie in energy production and savings, reduced personal environmental
impact, and other concerns. See Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 187 (Wis. 1982) (a neighbor's
proposed construction of a residence threatened to interfere with the plaintiff's access to unobstructed sunlight for solar energy). The problem may be more sensitive when community aesthetics are involved, especially for those communities that value their natural appearances. See
Richard G. Jones, Windmill Cuts Bills, but Neighbors Don't Want to Hear It, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
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doctrine and its dependence upon appropriators who make beneficial
and continuous use of the resource fails to contemplate such compet'2 51
ing "uses.
Moreover, the threshold test under the appropriation doctrine revolves around the date of first beneficial use. 252 In the instance where
an operating wind energy system is deprived of its wind supply by the
subsequent action of a neighbor, it should be undisputed as to who
was the first appropriator of the wind. Under the doctrine, a beneficial use is generally shown by demonstrating that a practical need exists for the activity, and that the activity is socially desirable. 253 Like
the appropriation of water to produce electricity, it should also be undisputed that the appropriation of wind to generate energy constitutes
a beneficial use. 254 The analysis should resemble the determination of
whether the use has economic and social value under the riparian use
test. 255 However, the beneficial use test is inadequate to address wind
rights. Because the test contemplates "use," the wind energy proprietor must certainly prevail because the obstructer is not seeking to
"use" the wind; in fact, his appropriation of the wind is incident to
other purposeful activity. Like many rights, appropriative rights can
be waived by a party's failure to exercise those rights. 256 Thus, the
small wind energy user who is threatened with or suffers a deprivation
of air flow must protest without delay once notice of the condition is
257
received.
The beneficial use inquiry is similar, although less extensive, than
the allowable and reasonable use test of the riparian doctrine, but it
may fail to give due consideration to some of the relevant facts of a
dispute. Appropriative rights, while not a complete theory to incorpo2007, at B1 (describing a conflict between a single small wind turbine at a residence and the
town's concern over the turbine's impact on community aesthetics and noise; the small wind
operator felt entitled to "the same life, liberty and pursuit of wind currents as anyone else").
251. The doctrine of appropriation generally requires that an appropriator intend to appropriate water for a beneficial use. See GETCHES, supra note 30, at 88. In the commercial wind farm
arena, direct competition over wind access is problematic. See, e.g., Rule, supra note 7, at 211.
Rule's assertion of a particular property rights theory almost ensures victory for an upwind appropriator who is in conflict with a downwind appropriator, regardless of which system was first
in operation. Id.
252. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
254. See Grand Hydro v. Grand River Dam Auth., 139 P.2d 798, 805 (Okla. 1943) (an electricity company secured the right to appropriate water because it was first in line and the use was of
a beneficial nature).
255. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
256. Axtell v. M.S. Consulting, 955 P.2d 1362, 1368 (Mont. 1998).
257. See id. at 1369.
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rate all of the interests at stake, may nevertheless have limited application where two landowners both seek to use the wind.

IV.

DOCTRINAL IMPACT ON LEGISLATIVE MEASURES

With the increasing development and reliance upon wind energy,
courts and legislatures will be asked to resolve controversies over obstruction of wind flow and conflicting uses by owners of neighboring
land. 258 This Comment does not suggest a total departure from traditional legal theories for wind turbine dispute resolution, but rather
suggests an alternative view that focuses on small wind energy operators and how their small-scale, though still valuable, ventures may be
protected from undesirable nuisance challenges and unreasonable interference. It is important to note that the disputes over wind blockages will not always be in the form of competition for the use of wind
itself; instead, the parties will typically compete over the use of airspace generally.
While property rights should be given due consideration in any legislation, an analysis of analogous riparian and prior appropriation doctrines that govern the use of water may help legislators craft
meaningful legislation that fosters and protects wind energy development at the residential level. Because some areas are more suitable to
wind energy development, legislation will be most effective at the
state and local levels, where regional physical characteristics and cus259
toms can help shape wind energy development.
A.

Regulation Based on the Riparian Doctrine

The "purpose of use" factor under the riparian analysis presents the
most likely problem with respect to the competition between a landowner who intends to harvest wind for his energy needs and his neighbor who intends to exercise his property rights by building and
maintaining structures that may interfere with the former's energy
production goals. Both activities are lawful and beneficial. Rather
than leave every situation to the balancing test, legislators should enact baseline standards that anticipate wind access disputes. For example, just as riparian rights are vested in watercourses adjacent to an
owner's land, "windcourses" could be defined in a manner that give
258. Smith, supra note 6, at 317.
259. See Salkin, supra note 227, at 9-161 to 9-163.
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residential wind energy systems precedence over interfering uses on
260
adjacent lands.
Macro data of the windiest regions in the country is readily available.2 6 1 After the regions are studied and identified on a local level,
legislators could draw districts that facilitate wind energy production.
Within these districts, zoning measures can provide small wind systems with a heightened degree of protection from obstruction. For
instance, Wisconsin granted local municipalities the authority to adopt
permitting measures that allow wind turbines to operate within municipal confines, provided that all requirements are met and that the application passes scrutiny at a public hearing. 262 However, the
authorization to enact such measures is not as effective as a mandate.
To more directly encourage the installation of small wind energy systems, states could, based on the foregoing, determine the areas that
are best suited for wind energy devices and, in accordance with federal and state goals, declare measureable goals for wind energy development in these areas. Such measures will also reduce the extent of
harm suffered by parties who must currently install systems while facing the risk that they will be sanctioned in the future. With guidelines
in place, a small wind operator and his neighbor can avoid situations
in which they will adversely affect one another. An operator can seek
to live in these turbine-friendly areas, while others can avoid the areas
or situate themselves in an area where the wind systems will not hinder them. Thus, when a wind energy operator constructs a permissible turbine, he cannot later be denied return on his investment when a
''263
neighbor "comes to the nuisance.
By declaring certain areas as suitable to small wind energy development, legislators will serve the interests of practicality and protection
of investments, and they will provide a set of guidelines for the implementation of wind energy development. Such guidelines will establish
260. Geographic zones can be mapped and height limits can be imposed on structures and
vegetation so as not to interfere with such systems, in addition to other familiar restrictions such
as setbacks and height limits. See Young, supra note 88, at 63-66 (discussing the revision of
zoning ordinances in order to foster wind energy sites and development, as well as addressing
wind turbine nuisance concerns like noise and visual impact).
261. The data is readily available on wind resource maps; however, local studies are needed to
help define the boundaries of wind energy zones that would be analogous to watercourses. See
NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SMALL WIND ELECTRIC SYSTEMS 11
(2007) (noting that prospective small wind operators often conduct their own studies to determine the feasibility of the installation of a small wind system).
262. Wis. STAT. § 66.0403(2)-(4) (2008).
263. See, e.g., Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635, 640 (N.D. 1992) (Meschke, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (holding that a property was zoned residential and therefore was not
suited to the installation of a wind turbine).
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baseline expectations for all landowners within suitable "wind-friendly
zones," and it will serve to meet and advance renewable energy policy
goals.
B.

Regulation Based on the PriorAppropriation Doctrine

The doctrine of prior appropriation is illustrative of the basic "first
come, first served" principle of resource allocation. 264 Any regulatory
measures adopted to augment and protect small wind energy rights
under this doctrine would need to incorporate a limitation on that
right. The limitation would need to apply equally in instances in
which an adjacent landowner has developed land that would conflict
with a subsequently installed small wind system and instances in which
a neighbor later seeks to develop his property in a manner that is adverse to the small wind operator. 265 Legislation drawn on the prior
appropriation doctrine must also address the beneficial use and abandonment factors.266 Although the beneficial use analysis under the
appropriation doctrine is similar to the reasonable use inquiry under
the riparian doctrine, some relevant facts and policy concerns may be
overlooked under the appropriation doctrine.2 67 By establishing an
abandonment stipulation, a land-use regulation measure will help balance any perceived harm to neighbors of small wind systems. If permitting schemes analogous to the procedure that was described in the
Wisconsin statute 268 are adopted, permit grantees should have a specified period of time in which to make the small wind energy system
operational and beneficial. If such ends are not achieved within the
stipulated time frame, then the failure should be considered an abandonment, and neighboring property should not be subject to land use
regulations that expressly address small wind energy systems. 2 69

264. See supra notes 164-175 and accompanying text.
265. Such a measure would be analogous to the majority's position in Rassier v. Houim, in
which the North Dakota Supreme Court let a wind turbine stand in a residential neighborhood
over the protests of a neighbor who later built a house on adjoining property. See 488 N.W.2d at
638-39.
266. See supra notes 164-175 and accompanying text.
267. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979) (requiring analysis of up to
nine factors to determine reasonableness of water use), with State Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes,
852 P.2d 1044, 1051 (Wash. 1993) (the beneficial use of water must be economically advantageous, reasonable, and not wasteful).
268. WIs. STAT. § 66.0403 (2008).
269. See, e.g., § 66.0403(9) (stating that the failure to install a functional device within two
years of the issuance of a permit terminates wind access rights).
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CONCLUSION

Under current law, there is little protection afforded to would-be
small wind energy system owners, yet the need for increased renewable energy development is increasing. Abundant authority exists in
the traditional water rights doctrines, and these authorities logically
and easily apply to wind energy issues. The lessons learned over two
centuries of American water appropriative doctrine need not be relearned with respect to protecting rights to appropriate wind for energy generation. Rather, the applicable portions of the riparian and
prior appropriation doctrines, as well as current public and social policy renewable energy goals, should be considered when drafting federal, state, and municipal legislation that address wind appropriation,
270
incentives for wind energy systems, and local land use regulations.
Because riparian rights are inherent in land, it follows that the creation of "wind-friendly zones" is the next logical step in zoning regulations in order to accommodate an increasing number of small wind
energy systems.
This Comment proposes that local land use regulations should be
enacted with the aim of establishing a minimum number of small wind
systems and meeting state-mandated wind-electricity production
within "wind-friendly zones." Much like water use, which is largely
regulated by doctrines that suit the character of the environment and
the demands of local communities, wind energy can be regulated and
protected in the same manner. To provide context and structure to
the development of wind rights regulations, legislators should create
wind zones that are analogous to watercourses. Property owners
within these zones should have riparian-like rights to the reasonable
use of the wind in general. Furthermore, because the doctrines governing water use have altered over time to accede to contemporary
demands, a wind rights doctrine based on water law will benefit from
the same flexibility as today's development, climate, and economic issues influence energy policy. These small adjustments will help shift

270. Many sources discuss practical policy and societal impacts related to the vitalization of
the renewable energy industry. See, e.g., JANET L. SAWIN, MAINSTREAMING RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 44-52 (Thomas Prugh ed., 2004) (discussing global policies for advancing wind and solar energy use, efforts to phase out conventional fossil fuel electricity
sources, and market and employment impacts within the energy sectors). A similar, more detailed treatment of the same issues is available in GIPE, WIND POWER, supra note 57.
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the legal landscape to encourage the installation of small wind energy
systems and support renewable energy goals.
Thaddeus Baria*
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